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Abstract: By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the 
law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current 
duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge 
and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less mor-
ally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the 
law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and 
injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of kill-
ing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at 
last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby. 
Keywords Manslaughter; Omission; Gross negligence; Duty of care; Duty to act; Homicide 
Criminal lawyers have long pondered over the rights and wrongs of imposing liability for an omission.1 The 
moral tensions in the law are highlighted in the classic example of a stranger walking past a drowning baby.2 
The public outrage following the death of Baby P3 highlights how important it is that members of society rec-
ognise their duty to act to protect the vulnerable. The government has unexpectedly launched a major reform 
of the substantive criminal law4 and its eyes are currently focused on the law of homicide. Major reforms to 
the partial defences to murder have been included in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and the govern-
ment has stated that consideration will also be given to the Law Commission's other recommendations re-
garding the homicide offences.5 This context makes it all the more important that the Law Commission's 
recommendations are the right way forward for the long-term future of the criminal law. While its proposals 
on homicide are generally very impressive and detailed,6 this is a broad area of law and this article will seek 
to highlight one particular issue which deserves further consideration. This issue is when liability should be 
imposed for manslaughter by omission. Following the case of R v Lowe,7 liability for an omission will not be 
imposed under the heading of constructive manslaughter, so the only possible basis for liability is at the 
moment gross negligence manslaughter and under the Law Commission's recommendations, killing by gross 
carelessness.8 
The current law is unnecessarily restrictive and complicated by requiring both a duty to act under common 
law and a duty of care (defined according to civil law principles) before liability for manslaughter by omission 
will be applied. The requirement of this double duty is duplicitous and restrictive, posing an unnecessary ob-
stacle for criminal liability in such cases. The critical issue should be whether a person owed a duty of care, 
criminal liability could then be imposed where the other elements of gross negligence manslaughter are sat-
isfied, which could include where a member of the public walks past a drowning baby without offering assis-
tance. Michael Moore has observed that liability for omissions should only be imposed for omissions 'that 
violate our duties sufficiently that the injustice of not punishing such wrongs outweighs the diminution of lib-
erty such punishment entails'.9 Thus, it comes down to a question of proportionality.10 Liability for an omis-
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sion would not be justified against a stranger to the victim where only a small amount of harm was caused by 
the omission, but where that omission has caused a death it is appropriate for the criminal law to intervene. 
Criminal lawyers should no longer sit back and debate the legal and moral dilemma of the failure to rescue 
the drowning baby, and accept that change is overdue. 
 
The current law 
 
It is part of the established criminal law that liability for an omission will only be imposed where there is a du-
ty to act. Various categories have been developed to determine whether there is such a duty to act (for ex-
ample, a close family relationship,11 the voluntary assumption of responsibility12 and the creation of a dan-
gerous situation13). In addition, in the case of R v Adomako14 the House of Lords stated that a defendant 
must owe a duty of care in order for liability for gross negligence manslaughter to be imposed. The case of R 
v Khan and Khan15 subsequently drew attention to the potential relevance of the old case law on omissions 
and the duty to act in the context of manslaughter by omission. Thus, it would seem that both a duty to act 
and a duty of care would need to be established in order for there to be liability for gross negligence man-
slaughter by omission. The potential impact of this double requirement is illustrated by a scenario where a 
stranger shares a hostel room with a drug addict. If she notices that the drug addict is showing the symptoms 
of an overdose but chooses to do nothing and the drug addict dies, she will not be liable for manslaughter. 
While a court might find that she owed the drug user a duty of care because it was reasonably foreseeable 
that by her omission the victim would suffer harm, she would not be under any duty to act because her rela-
tionship with the drug user does not fall within any of the categories in which a duty to act would be imposed. 
This article argues that the legal requirement of a duty of care serves a valid purpose, but the additional re-
quirement of a duty to act is an unnecessary restriction on liability, placing an undue emphasis on individual 
autonomy at the expense of social responsibility and moral values. 
The concepts of a duty to act and a duty of care have proved problematic in their own right, a problem which 
is then aggravated by the requirement that both these concepts be established to impose liability for gross 
negligence manslaughter by omission. Looking first at the common law rules on the existence of a duty to 
act, these have been the subject of significant academic criticism.16 They are narrow in practice and have 
proved difficult to state with certainty,17 to the point that the Law Commission decided it would be impossible 
to codify these rules for the purposes of the draft Criminal Code.18 The Commission observed: 
It is extremely unsatisfactory that the law should remain uncertain in this important area.... If the top lawyers 
in a Government committee find the law hard to state clearly, what hope have the Stones and Dobinsons of 
this world of ascertaining their legal position, in advance of prosecution, when they find themselves landed 
with a hunger-striking relative?19 
It went so far as to suggest that the law in this area fails to meet the standard of certainty required by the 
European Convention on Human Rights.20 The House of Lords itself has acknowledged that this area of law 
lacks certainty, with Lord Mustill observing in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland21 'precisely in what circumstances 
such a duty should be held to exist is at present quite unclear'.22 
The courts openly favour the incremental development of relationships which can give rise to a duty to act,23 
despite the fact that this inevitably leads to increased uncertainty. The Court of Appeal in R v Sinclair24 rec-
ognised the risk that there could be 'such elasticity in that expansion that potential defendants are unaware 
until after the event whether their conduct is capable of being regarded as criminal'.25 
As regards the meaning of a duty of care for the purposes of gross negligence manslaughter, this has been 
explored in detail by Jonathan Herring and Elaine Palser.26 When Adomako27 was first decided the meaning 
of a duty of care in this context caused some confusion.28 It is now relatively clear that it has its ordinary civil 
meaning as developed in the law of negligence. Thus a person owes a duty of care to another where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that their acts or omissions will cause harm to another. The Court of Appeal has re-
cently clarified in R v Evans29 that the meaning of a duty of care is an issue of law determined by the judge, 
with the jury deciding whether the facts of the case fall within that legal definition.30 The problems in trying to 
apply civil law concepts to criminal law offences was highlighted in the case of R v Wacker: 
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... the very same public policy that causes the civil courts to refuse the claim points in quite different direc-
tions in considering a criminal offence. The criminal law has as its function the protection of citizens and 
gives effect to the state's duty to try those who have deprived citizens of their rights of life, limb or property. It 
may very well step in at the precise moment when civil courts withdraw because of this very different func-
tion. The withdrawal of a civil remedy has nothing to do with whether as a matter of public policy the criminal 
law applies. The criminal law should not be disapplied just because the civil law is disapplied. It has its own 
public policy aim which may require a different approach to the involvement of the law.31 
Turning to the interrelationship between the duty to act and the duty of care, where the common law duty to 
act arises it would generally also be reasonably foreseeable that harm would result from the defendant's acts 
or omissions because of the closeness of the relationship between the parties. But not every person who can 
foresee that his failure to act would cause harm to the victim, would have a close enough relationship to the 
victim to give rise to the common law duty to act, the classic example being the stranger who walks past a 
baby drowning. If a stranger to the victim created the original dangerous situation then the case of Miller32 
can be applied to find a duty to act.33 This was the situation in Evans34 where the appellant was the elder 
half-sister of the victim. She had supplied the victim with heroin, and after the victim had injected herself with 
the drug, the victim had shown signs of overdosing. The appellant had recognised those signs but had been 
frightened to call for medical assistance in case she or the victim got into trouble. She therefore put the victim 
to bed, wiped water on her face to cool her and hoped that she would sleep it off. In the morning the victim 
was dead. Following the case of R v Kennedy (No. 2)35 a prosecution for constructive manslaughter could 
not succeed because the requirement of causation would not be satisfied. Instead the appellant was suc-
cessfully prosecuted for gross negligence manslaughter and her appeal dismissed. A duty to act was found 
relying on the case of Miller.36 
However, if the defendant did not create the original dangerous situation, the requirement of a duty to act 
may prevent the imposition of criminal liability where the defendant is not a close relative to the victim. For 
example, if an adult is in a park and sees a child he does not know become dangerously entangled in some 
playing equipment, he might have a duty of care to that child but there would be no duty to act under the 
common law. 
 
The confusion between a duty of care and a duty to act 
 
In practice, the distinction between the duty of care and the duty to act is often not drawn by the courts and 
sometimes the duty to act is referred to as a 'duty to care'37 or even as a 'duty of care'.38 This confusion is 
particularly problematic as, following the case of Evans,39 the trial judge must direct the jury on the legal 
meaning of both a duty of care and a duty to act so that the jury can then apply the facts of the case to those 
legal definitions to determine whether both those forms of duty exist in a relevant case of manslaughter by 
omission. The task of the jury will not be facilitated if trial judges are themselves blurring these two concepts. 
In Evans, the judgment continues the confusion between a duty of care and a duty to act by frequently 
grouping the two concepts together rather than clearly distinguishing them. Thus, in explaining the direction 
given by the trial judge to the jury, the Court of Appeal slides from a discussion of the duty to act to a refer-
ence to a duty of care without apparently noting the legal significance of this transition: 
He [the trial judge] directed the jury that before they could convict on manslaughter by omission, 'there must 
be a pre-existing duty to act' ... 
The judge told the jury that he would direct them 'as to the circumstances in which such a duty can arise as a 
matter of law' but it would be for the jury to decide whether, on the facts they found, either or each of the de-
fendants owed such a duty towards the deceased. In the case of the appellant he directed the jury that as a 
matter of law the blood relationship between the appellant and her half sister, who was a minor, did not of 
itself give rise to a duty of care.40 
When explaining the reasoning of the Court of Appeal for rejecting the appellant's appeal, the Lord Judge CJ 
states: 
In those cases, such as those arising from a doctor/patient relationship where the existence of the duty is not 
in dispute, the judge may well direct the jury that a duty of care exists ... In any cases where the issue is in 
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dispute, and therefore in more complex cases, and assuming that the judge has found that it would be open 
to the jury to find that there was a duty of care, or a duty to act, the jury should be directed that if facts a + b 
and / or c or d are established, then in law a duty will arise, but if facts x or y or z were present, the duty 
would be negatived.41 
While some parts of the judgment make a clear reference to both a duty of care and a duty to act42 other 
parts of the judgment identify a duty of care using reasoning which looks more closely aligned to the com-
mon law for the finding of a duty to act and the two concepts are effectively blurred together as one. Thus, 
the Court of Appeal stated that there is nothing in the appellant's conduct 'capable of amounting to an ac-
ceptance or an assumption of responsibility' so as to give rise to 'a duty of care', so the Court of Appeal is 
applying the law relating to a duty to act, but as if it determines the existence of a duty of care.43 Two para-
graphs later, the court reverts to describing this (correctly) as a duty to act.44 
This confusion has continued with the academic analysis of the case, with Glenys Williams45 interpreting 
Evans as requiring a single duty of care established on the basis of Miller.46 This interpretation of the case 
blurs what at the moment are actually two separate legal issues. It treats Miller as a case used to interpret 
the duty of care for gross negligence manslaughter and as a result fails to recognise that the Miller test for 
omissions liability amounts to an additional requirement on top of the requirement for a duty of care. 
In Sinclair47 the appeal was argued on the basis that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the victim, 
but the main case referred to support this argument was Stone and Dobinson.48 It therefore seems that what 
was actually being referred to was the duty to act. 
The duty of care/duty to act distinction is an issue which is causing the jury some difficulties. The trial judge 
in Sinclair ruled that 'it was for the jury to decide whether the defendants had voluntarily assumed the care of 
the deceased so as to assume a legal duty of care to him'. Rather unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal note: 
It is apparent that the jury were troubled by this aspect of the case, because they returned with a question 
seeking further guidance about the legal duty of care about which they said they were 'unsure'.49 
While in Khan and Khan50 and Evans51 the Court of Appeal makes express reference to the duty to act cases 
in common law, the majority of cases involving gross negligence manslaughter by omission are more am-
biguous on the issue. The Court of Appeal in Singh52 was concerned with an omission, but made no refer-
ence to Khan and Khan or the common law cases on a duty to act. There is no reference to such cases in R 
v Clothier53 either, despite the fact that the crux of the prosecution case was that the defendants had failed to 
maintain a tractor, thereby rendering it dangerous. While in Wacker54 (a case involving the tragic deaths of 
illegal Chinese immigrants in the defendant's lorry) the Court of Appeal did raise the question of whether 
closing the vent and/or not opening it again might best be classified as an act or omission, but it did not feel it 
necessary to make a clear finding on this issue.55 Though a passing reference to a failure to act might sug-
gest it was considered to be an omission,56 the court does not make any direct reference to the common law 
cases on duties to act, stating that it had: 
no difficulty in concluding that in these circumstances the defendant did voluntarily assume the duty of care 
for the Chinese in this regard. He was aware that no one's actions other than his own could realistically pre-
vent the Chinese from suffocating to death ...57 
This would appear to be an oblique reference to the 'assumption of responsibility' criterion for the imposition 
of a duty to act. 
In R v Brian Dean58 the jury was instructed that criminal liability could be imposed for gross negligence man-
slaughter on the basis of either an act or an omission, with the assumption that it would make no difference 
to the law that was applied. In considering the defendant's appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeal 
explained that: 
the jury had to be sure of the following: (1) that the appellant owed a duty of care to his employees, Michael 
and Carl Redgate; (2) that he was in breach of that duty by failing to warn them that it was dangerous to re-
move the buck stays before demolishing the brickwork; (3) that that breach of duty caused the death of the 
two Redgates; and (4) that the breach of duty amounted to gross negligence.59 
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No reference was made to the duty to act, though this could be explained on the ground that the duty to act 
is well established between an employer and employee. Ultimately the jury convicted on the basis of an 
omission--that the defendant had failed to warn his employee of the danger of removing buck stays before 
the brickwork was demolished when preparing a kiln for demolition. 
Finally, in R v Willoughby60 the court failed to identify whether the victim's death was caused by an omission 
(failing to protect the safety of the victim) or a positive act (lighting the petrol). As a result, again, no refer-
ence is made to the common law cases on the subject.61 
 
An alternative interpretation 
 
While the approach taken in Khan and Khan,62 requiring both a duty to act and a duty of care for gross neg-
ligence manslaughter by omission, seems to have gained acceptance by the courts63 and academics,64 the 
House of Lords judgment of Adomako65 explaining the law on gross negligence manslaughter could have 
been interpreted differently. Adomako itself can be viewed as a case involving liability for an omission, as an 
anaesthetist failed to reconnect an oxygen tube when it became disconnected during an operation. Yet the 
House of Lords judgment makes no reference at all to the common law cases on the existence of a duty to 
act. Lord MacKay simply stated: 
The essence of the matter, which is supremely a jury question, is whether having regard to the risk of death 
involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgment to 
a criminal act or omission.66 
It could be argued that this failure to make a direct reference to the common law cases on a duty to act was 
simply because the duty to act between doctors and patients was clearly established in the law and therefore 
needed no further discussion. An alternative interpretation of Adomako could have been that the duty of care 
required for the imposition of liability for gross negligence manslaughter by either an act or an omission, in-
corporates the duty to act. There would then be no need to find two separate duties--the duty of care and the 
duty to act--where the facts of the case amount to an omission. By requiring evidence of two duties, the law 
is unnecessarily complicated and inappropriately restrictive regarding the imposition of liability for an omis-
sion which leads to a death. A requirement that where the death was caused by an omission, defendants will 
only be liable for manslaughter if they owed a duty to act under common law, must be intended to restrict 
further the range of people who can be liable for this offence. But, as will be argued below, this restriction 
risks injustice in allowing culpable individuals to take no responsibility for their conduct: it is the fact that harm 
was reasonably foreseeable (for the purposes of a duty of care) which establishes a factual situation which 
could be as culpable as if a positive act had been carried out by the defendant. 
 
The Law Commission's recommendations 
 
The Law Commission's draft code preserves the common law on omissions.67 It commented that: 
the present law has been the subject of much criticism, and we consider that it would not be appropriate for it 
to be codified without reform.68 
As the Law Commission's final recommendation was that the criticised common law should remain in force, 
this seems particularly unsatisfactory.69 In the ideal world the Law Commission would like to consider liability 
for omissions in the context of a discrete law reform project 'when resources and competing priorities per-
mit',70 but it would be a shame to legislate an unsatisfactory reform for involuntary manslaughter for want of 
this opportunity. While the Law Commission has recommended some significant reforms to the law of murder 
and voluntary manslaughter, its recommendations in relation to involuntary manslaughter are less radical. 
With regard to gross negligence manslaughter the Commission's most recent report on the reform of the 
homicide offences71 refers back to is earlier recommendation in 1996.72 The relevant offence would be de-
fined in the following terms: 
 




   (2)     a risk that his or her conduct will cause death would be obvious to a reasonable person 
in his or her position; 
 
   (3)     he or she is capable of appreciating that risk at the material time; and 
 
   (4)      his or her conduct falls far below what can reasonably be expected of him or her in the 
circumstances.73 
 
The draft Homicide Bill prepared by the Law Commission in 1996 and referred to on this subject with ap-
proval in the more recent Law Commission papers on homicide,74 included a further provision regarding lia-
bility for an omission, which the Law Commission appears to intend to retain. This states: 
A person is not guilty of an offence under sections 1 or 2 above by reason of an omission unless the omis-
sion is in breach of a duty at common law.75 
Thus, the Law Commission suggests liability should be imposed for both acts and omissions, but that liability 
for an omission should only be applied where the common law rules on the existence of a duty to act are 
satisfied. Therefore, like the draft Criminal Code Bill, the Commission would keep the existing common law 
rules in this area, not because it considers them particularly successful or effective in achieving justice, but 
because it regards them as so unclear that they would be difficult to codify accurately, and because the is-
sues raised with regard to liability for omissions are too substantial to be considered within the constraints of 
its review of involuntary manslaughter.76 
Parliament has already shown a willingness to criminalise omissions which contribute to a death, through the 
creation of a new offence in the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. This offence is committed 
where a victim in the defendant's household was or should have been aware that the victim was at significant 
risk of serious physical harm and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the death.77 It was under this of-
fence that the carers of Baby P were convicted.78 In R v Khan,79 members of the same household as the vic-
tim who was killed by her husband were held liable for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent her death. 
They had witnessed several incidents of serious domestic abuse in the weeks before the victim's death. 
Their appeals against conviction under s. 5 of the 2004 Act were dismissed, even though the final attack had 
taken place away from the home in the garage and involved more significant violence than the previous in-
cidents. 
The Law Commission would remove the notion of a 'duty of care' and replace it with the test of whether it 
would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes that the conduct involved a risk of 
death.80 
The removal of the cross-reference to civil law would have the benefit of maintaining the emphasis on 
whether there was an obvious risk of death, while avoiding the complications of directly cross-referring to the 
civil law. In particular, alongside the duty of care laid down in negligence, there are restrictions on where lia-
bility will be imposed for an omission in civil law, which are strikingly similar to those laid down in criminal 
law.81 A defence lawyer could not argue under the proposed new offence that these civil limitations should 
apply to the offence of killing by gross carelessness. 
 
The floodgates will hold 
 
It is disappointing that the Law Commission, like the courts, is not ready to let go of the common law rules on 
omission in the context of killing by gross carelessness. This reluctance may reflect an anxiety that the impo-
sition of a general liability for omission could open up the floodgates with potentially large numbers of the 
public being exposed to the risk of prosecution and conviction for a very serious offence. However, the fact 
that a death has been caused cannot be ignored; it is central to the question of whether criminalisation is 
required and a justification for distinguishing manslaughter by omission from other offences committed by 
omission. The relevance of the gravity of the harm to the decision whether to criminalise an omission was 
acknowledged by the Criminal Law Revision Committee which recommended that liability for omissions in 
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the sphere of offences against the person should be confined to the more serious offences82 As Grant La-
mond has pointed out: 
The strength of the reason in favour of punishment will depend upon the overall gravity of the wrong, which 
depends in turn on the importance of the interest or value at stake, the degree of violation (or risk of viola-
tion) that the wrong created, and the kind of disrespect shown by the wrongdoer.83 
To ignore the harm and focus on the omission as a basis for refusing the application of the criminal law leads 
to the criminalisation of the person who steals the baby's dummy, but not if he lets the baby drown.84 
With the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, the right to life guaranteed by Article 2 of the European 
Convention must also be borne in mind.85 This imposes a positive obligation on the State which would be 
breached if the criminal law did not adequately protect this right. In other words, by potentially ignoring 
deaths caused by an omission, Article 2 could be violated. The civil law on omissions has been forced to shift 
in the light of the European Convention86 and it would be wise for any reforms to the English law of homicide 
to take this into account. The right to life is so fundamental that it should have additional protection over and 
above the right to, for example, property and this protection must extend to where this loss of life is caused 
by the omission of a stranger, not just omissions by the narrow range of people treated in common law as 
owing a duty to act. Philippa Foot has suggested that a failure to come to the rescue is merely contrary to the 
virtue of charity which will not give rise to legal rights, but in the UK the right to life is respected by the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and this must be legally relevant.87 
By removing the specific requirement of a duty to act in the context of manslaughter, there is no risk of 
opening the floodgates to limitless liability because the offence itself already has built within it important re-
strictions. Liability will only be imposed if there was an obvious risk of death, the death was caused by the 
defendant, and he or she was grossly careless. The failure to act may be due to a wide range of reasons, 
such as miscalculation, momentary inattentiveness or clumsiness,88 but the omission will only be criminalised 
if the defendant's conduct falls far below what can reasonably be expected in the circumstances. Thus in 
determining whether a person has been grossly careless, a court could take into account the defendant's 
physical proximity to the victim, whether a rescue attempt would have been dangerous for the defendant, 
whether the victim wanted to be rescued and whether the defendant had the capacity to carry out a rescue. 
One of Glanville Williams' objections to liability for omissions is that: 
I cannot be made criminally responsible when I knowingly fail to save (and do not even try to save) the lives 
of unfortunate inhabitants of the Ganges delta who are drowned in floods; yet I could do something to help 
them by selling my house and giving the money to a suitable charity.89 
This example highlights that in criminalising omissions, limits in time and space must be applied and these 
limits will be applied through the requirements of an obvious risk of death, gross carelessness and causation, 
there is no need for the additional requirement of a duty to act. 
 
Omissions in a modern society 
 
To determine whether the law took a wrong turning in the case of Khan and Khan,90 which should not be fol-
lowed by the Law Commission, consideration needs to be given to the fundamental question of whether lia-
bility for an omission should be more restrictive than for an act and, if so, what level of restrictions are re-
quired. When a stranger leaves a baby to drown, this would appear to be potentially a 'perfect moral fault' as 
identified by Samuel Freeman.91 He considers that a 'perfect moral duty' to give emergency assistance to aid 
those who are about to suffer a great physical or mental injury existed when: 
 
   (a)     we have the clear opportunity and are in a privileged position to give aid; 
 
   (b)     we have knowledge of their jeopardy and knowledge of the means necessary to relieve 
it; 
 





   (d)     we can do so at negligible risk, minimal costs and at little inconvenience to ourselves.92 
 
He argues persuasively that there are no convincing reasons why this perfect moral duty should not be en-
forced by the criminal law. 
The most self-interested of persons can be motivated to rescue a drowning infant in a ... pool at little costs to 
his freedom of action, so long as there are sufficient sanctions--positive or negative--in place to induce that 
conduct.93 
In the case of the drowning baby scenario, it is true that the only thing that links the stranger to the death of 
the baby is his chance presence at the scene.94 While there is an element of bad luck for the stranger, the 
fact is that he was present at the scene and there is no justification for the law to ignore this factual reality 
completely. This moral duty to save the baby can be effectively enforced in English criminal law by the of-
fence of gross negligence manslaughter where the potential victim risks being killed. The factors Freeman 
lists in determining the existence of the moral duty are all factors which would be relevant in determining 
whether a defendant had a duty of care and whether his omission was grossly negligent--looking for the 
common law duty to act is an artificial restraint on this 'perfect moral duty'. 
Law and morality seemed to be moving closer with regard to deaths by omission with the judgment of Lord 
Coleridge in R v Instan95 at the end of the 19th century, but the courts have refused to accept Lord Cole-
ridge's lead, and law and morality as a result have parted ways.96 While law and morals do not always need 
to correlate, they should not veer too widely apart without good reason, particularly where those moral values 
have a logical foundation based on social responsibility and the reduction of harm. In the civil law context, 
the courts have been willing to acknowledge that legal policy can be legitimately influenced by community 
morals and expectations.97 Lord Steyn commented that in difficult cases: 
a judge is entitled to rely on what he reasonably believes the ordinary citizen would regard as right, and that 
the judges sense of the moral answer to a question ... has been one of the great shaping forces of the com-
mon law.98 
In the criminal law context, Kay LJ in Wacker99 was clearly concerned with the moral views of the public, in 
saying that 'all right-minded people would be astonished if the propositions being advanced on behalf of the 
defendant correctly represented the law of the land'.100 
Michael Moore has argued that acts that violate negative duties are of greater moral significance than omis-
sions that violate their positive counterparts.101 Thus, killing is worse than letting someone die, and stealing is 
worse than allowing another to steal from a third party. But it does not follow that letting someone die is al-
ways worse than stealing.102 This relative moral significance of positive duties compared with negative duties 
is the justification for seeking criminal liability for manslaughter rather than murder where the omission is by a 
stranger to the victim. Where a moral distinction is seen between killings resulting from an act or an omis-
sion, this distinction seems primarily to be because of the associated difference in the mens rea of the de-
fendant--an act is more likely to involve intention while an omission is more likely to involve negligence. It is 
therefore preferable for the law to distinguish these different forms of involvement through the mens rea 
threshold of the offences, rather than by tightening the actus reus requirements for omissions.103 While in the 
context of murder, the offence is so bluntly defined that the reliance on the exceptions for an omission can be 
central to achieving justice, in the context of manslaughter there are other restrictions on liability, mentioned 
above, which will ensure that injustice is avoided. 
Glanville Williams104 pointed out that medical ethics draw a fundamental moral distinction between killing and 
letting die (in breach of duty).105 This moral distinction can, however, be reflected in the other requirements 
for gross careless manslaughter, rather than falling back on the absence of a duty to act to give rise to liabil-
ity for an omission. If the proposed reforms were introduced, the doctors in Anthony Bland's case106 would 
still not be liable for murder as the proposed changes will only have an impact on involuntary manslaughter. 
Nor will they be liable for killing by gross carelessness because their conduct could not be found to be 
grossly careless to the point that it justifies criminal liability. 
Generally, in terms of the definition of the fatal offences the modus operandi is irrelevant until the point of 
sentencing is reached--an offence is still murder or manslaughter regardless of whether a knife, gun or poi-
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son was used for the killing. The moral irrelevance of the modus operandi should not be forgotten when the 
killing is caused by an omission. What is central to liability for an omission is not the personal or contractual 
relationship between the defendant and the victim, but the fact that the defendant made a voluntary choice 
not to act to, for example, rescue the victim. If the defendant had been asleep at the time of the death and 
unaware of the circumstances leading to the death then there would be no question of describing him or her 
as 'omitting to rescue'. A failure to act will only be treated as an omission if the defendant had the opportunity 
and ability to act, was aware that he had the opportunity and ability, and the act was reasonably expected of 
him.107 As George Fletcher has observed 'the only kind of omitting that is interesting is the kind in which hu-
man agency is expressed'.108 The significance of the actus reus of any offence is that a person has behaved 
voluntarily as this means that he was able to make a choice to go ahead and commit the crime or not.109 
Whether this voluntary choice manifests itself in the form of an act or an omission is irrelevant. 
In determining when liability for an omission should be imposed, Andrew Ashworth has contrasted the 'con-
ventional view' with the 'social responsibility' view.110 He argues that the former prioritises social autonomy 
and liberty whereas the latter emphasises the duties of citizens in a healthy society. He favours the latter ap-
proach to justify a wider imposition of liability for omissions.111 The imposition of liability for the omission is 
justified because of the interdependence of individuals in a functioning and healthy society--such liability 
should not therefore be restricted to blood relations or formal legal relations.112 Such arguments are all the 
more convincing at a time when excessive individual freedom is being identified as a cause of the current 
economic crisis and state intervention to restrict such freedoms is being seen as a necessity. 
By contrast, Glanville Williams has argued forcefully in support of the common law, conventional view.113 
However, the common law rules date back to an era when 'private selfishness was elevated to the rank of a 
public virtue'.114 In the context of a modern society where the majority of adults walk around with mobile 
phones in their pockets, it would not be too onerous a burden on members of the public to require them to 
request assistance to a person in peril, even if they should not be inclined, or able, to provide the assistance 
themselves. Perhaps a reluctance to impose such a duty was understandable in the past when means of 
communication were more limited, but totally unjustifiable in a modern society where communication systems 




When legislating the Law Commission's recommendations on involuntary manslaughter, the reference to the 
common law on omissions should be deleted so that it would no longer be necessary to prove a separate 
duty to act for manslaughter by omission. The removal of the common law rules would only have an impact 
on the offence of manslaughter and these rules would continue to apply to other offences. Alongside this 
amendment to the proposed reforms, two statutory defences should be included which would provide ade-
quate protection for those prosecuted for manslaughter by omission. The first of these defences would pro-
vide that where the defendant's conduct amounted to an omission, he would not be liable for manslaughter if 
a reasonable attempt had been made to contact the emergency or social services. The second defence 
could be modelled on s. 50 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which provides a statutory defence to the incho-
ate offences of assisting or encouraging a crime,115 as follows: 
 
   (1)     A person is not guilty of an offence under this section if he proves-- 
 
   (a)     that he knew or believed certain circumstances existed; and 
 
   (b)     that it was reasonable for him to act or omit to act as he did in those circumstances. 
 
   (2)     Factors to be considered in determining whether it was reasonable for a person to act 
as he did include-- 
 
   (a)     the seriousness of the anticipated offence; 
 




   (2)     (c) any authority by which he claims to have been acting or omitting to act. 
 
This defence would recognise that a person can only be expected to act within the limits of his own personal 
capacity, a limitation which is already recognised in the existing common law rules where a duty to act is im-
posed.116 
The fact that the offence was committed by an omission could be taken into account at the point of sentenc-
ing. The judges already, on occasion, draw a distinction between sentencing for gross negligence man-
slaughter by an act and gross negligence manslaughter by an omission. In R v Harrhy and Harrhy,117 the 
Lord Chief Justice stated: 
It is a trite observation that the appropriate sentence for manslaughter is more widely variable than perhaps 
any other offence. But we have to bear in mind that a sentence must be related to the criminality of a de-
fendant's conduct and not be determined by the outcome of that conduct alone, however catastrophic. This 
was a case of gross negligence by pure omission.118 
Therefore, if on the facts of a case the omission suggests that the offence was less serious than certain other 
forms of manslaughter, this can be reflected in the sentence given. 
In conclusion, by removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, 
the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in Adomako.119 The current duplic-
itous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the 
jury. Causing a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensi-
ble than where a harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more 
closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices 
would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by 
gross carelessness, along with the availability of suggested new statutory defences. Through this reform jus-
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